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actually served the entity or person intended; or whether plaintiff
actually meant to serve and sue a different person.20
Applying this test to the facts in the Gilbert case, it is probable that
the plaintiff intended to sue the individual members of the school
board rather than the board as an entity. There are no facts from
which it can be inferred that the plaintiff was under the misconception
that the board was not a corporation. Therefore, the effect of the
amendment was to bring in a new party, and the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky was correct in holding that the statute of limitations was
a bar to the amended complaint.
Although the decision in the Gilbert case appears sound, it is hoped
that the Court of Appeals of Kentucky will not follow the line of
cases represented by Lingar v. Harlan Fuel Co. All of those cases
were decided prior to the adoption of Rule 15.03 of the Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence, the Court of Appeals should feel
free to adopt the position of the Florida Supreme Court in Cabot v.
Clearwater Construction Co. since that case involved the interpreta-
tion of a rule which is identical with Kentucky Rule 15.03.21
James Park, Jr.
ToRTs-BLAs iNG-Snucr LLxBrrr FOR CONCUSSION DAmAcE-Plain-
tiff, a landowner, brought an action against the City of Nicholasville
and Aldredge-Poage, Inc., a construction company, for damage to her
house and outbuildings resulting from blasting. The blasting was
done by the company pursuant to its contract with the city to con-
struct a water line from the Kentucky River to Nicholasville over a
right-of-way furnished by the city.1 Plaintiff alleged trespass damage
from flying rocks, concussion and vibration, and negligence on the
part of the construction company and received a judgment for $10,200
against both defendants on verdicts of $200 for the trespass damage
and $10,000 for damages resulting from negligence. Held: Judgment
against the city affirmed; judgment against the construction company
affirmed as to the trespass, reversed as to the negligence. Since plain-
20 2 Moore, Federal Practice see. 4.44, at p. 1042 (2d ed. 1948). See also,
Wagner v. New York, 0. & W. Ry., 146 F. Supp. 926 (M.D. Pa. 1956). For an
excellent application of this test, see Sanders v. Metzger, 66 F. Supp. 262 (E.D.
Pa. 1946).
21 Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.15(c).
1 The city was joined as defendant by reason of an easement obtained from
the plaintiff in which the city covenanted to repair, or reimburse the landowner
for, damage to the property resulting from the construction, repair, replacement
or maintenance of the water line.
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tiff failed to show the usual method of conducting blasting in the
particular situation or that her injuries were the result of defendant
company's negligence, there was insufficient evidence to present to
the jury a question of negligence, which, under Kentucky's rule, must
be proved to recover for concussion/vibration damage resulting from
blasting.2 Therefore, defendant company's liability extended only to
the damage done by flying rocks. Aldridge-Poage, Inc. v. Parks, 297
S.W. 2d 632 (Ky. 1956).
Kentucky is one of the few jurisdictions3 which still recognize the
distinction between trespass for flying debris, and concussion/vibra-
tion damage resulting from blasting, imposing strict liability for
the former, requiring proof of negligence as to the latter.4 His-
torically, the trespass rule is a survivor of the early tort law concept
that one acted at his peril and was answerable for those acts which
harmed another without regard to the actor's moral fault. This con-
cept survived in Kentucky in the case of trespass to land until 1956
and provided a basis for the Kentucky blasting rule, which limits re-
covery without proof of negligence to those direct invasions which
were actionable under the common law action of trespass.6 This did
not include "indirect" concussion/vibration damage for which the
proper remedy was an action on the case which has long required
proof of wrongful intent or negligence. 7
However, the notion of strict liability for trespass to land, which
was the basis of the Kentucky blasting rule, has long since been
repudiated by the majority of jurisdictions in this country." The Ken-
tucky Court finally repudiated the doctrine in 1956 in a case involving
an unintended, non-negligent trespass to land in the form of a rock
2 The court concluded not to re-examine the rule, notwithstanding doubts
as to its soundness, probably because its harshness could be avoided through the
city's covenant to repair. See note 1 supra.
3 Prosser, Torts 336 (2d ed. 1955), where it is said that only seven or eight
jurisdictions recognize the distinction. 20 A.L.R. 2d 1388 (1951) lists nine suchjurisdictions-Alamaba, California, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York and Texas.
4 Marlowe Constr. Co. v. Jacobs, 302 S.W. 2d 612 (Ky. 1957); Aldridge-
Poage, Inc. v. Parks, 297 S.W. 2d 632 (Ky. 1956); Williams v. Codell Constr.
Co., 253 Ky. 166, 69 S.W. 2d 20, 92 A.L.R. 737 (1934); Jefferson County v.
Pohlman, 243 Ky. 556, 49 S.W. 2d 344 (1932); Brooks-Calloway Co. v. Carroll,
235 Ky. 41 29 S W. 2d 592 (1930); Campbell v. Adams, 228 Ky. 156, 14 S.W. 2d
418 (1929).
5 Prosser, Torts 14, 54 (2d ed. 1955).
3 Id. at 336.
7 Id. at 27, 336. But see Adams & Sullivan v. Sengel, 177 Ky. 535, 197 S.W.
974, 7 A.L.R. 268 (1917), where there was both trespass and concussion dam-
ages, and full recovery was allowed upon proof of the trespass alone.




thrown from the dual wheels of a truck9 Yet in cases involving a
trespass to land resulting from blasting, as in the principal case, the
court reverts to the use of trespass strict liability. The modem view
is that the strict liability arises out of the nature of the activity, not
the manner of injury.10
Beyond this, the trespass approach inevitably presents the prob-
lem of drawing a distinction between trespass and case. Since at the
common law a trespass was conceived of as a direct invasion of land,"
attempts to force concussion/vibration damage into the trespass con-
cept are resisted. Courts which use the trespass approach to blasting
cases have found concussion/vibration damages to be "indirect", "con-
sequential", and not a "technical trespass." 12 This reasoning has been
widely criticized as scientific ignorance, but it was part of the common
law. All that needs to be said is that a common law pleading tech-
nicality ought not be a limitation on modem substantive law.13 In the
words of Mr. Justice Holmes:
[Ilt can hardly be supposed that a man's responsibility
for the consequences of his acts varies as the remedy happens to fall
on one side or the other of the penumbra which separates trespass
from the action on the case.14
Certainly no layman, whose respect the law seeks to cultivate, could
appreciate the distinction, especially when the disparity of damages
is as great as in the principal case.
Though the basis for trespass strict liability is gone and no just
distinction can be made between trespass damages and concussion/
vibration damages, this is not to say that liability in blasting cases
ought to be based on negligence alone. Although negligence has been
suggested as the basis of liability for blasting, upon the theory that in
most instances it was either negligent to undertake the blasting or
the blasting was negligently conducted, 15 the principal case reveals
the fallacy in this approach. In light of the utility and general public
benefit of the project there involved, it seems unlikely that fault, in
the tort sense of the word, could be found in the act of blasting in
the Kentucky countryside. Nor was the plaintiff able to prove that
9 Randall v. Shelton, 293 S.W. 2d 559 (Ky. 1956), commented on in 46
K.L.J. 187 (1957). It should be emphasized that the holding in this case related
to an unintended, non-negligent trespass arising out of an intentional act. Where-
in do the blasting cases differ except in the nature of the activity?
10 2 Harper and James, Torts sec. 14.6 (1956).
11 id. sec. 1.3.
132 1 id. & sec. 1.3 at 14; 2 id. see. 14.7 at 818.
13 2 id. sec. 14.7.
14 Holmes, The Common Law 80 (1881).
15 Smith, "Liability for Substantial Damage to Land by Blasting-The Rule
of the Future. II," 33 Harv. L. Rev. 667, 672 (1920).
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the blasting was negligently conducted. Blasting by its very nature
does not lend itself to proof of negligence, since much of the evidence
is consumed in the explosion and what proof remains is largely in the
knowledge of hostile witnesses. Clinging to otherwise discarded tres-
pass strict liability in blasting cases is strongly indicative that the
Kentucky Court recognized a need for more than negligence liability.
Further, the court has circumvented true negligence liability where
the need was great by placing the defendant at a procedural disad-
vantage through the application of res ipsa loquitur.'0
The inadequacies of the trespass and negligence approaches pre-
sent no problem, however, since there is available the twentieth cen-
tury concept of strict liability. It has been found that, as a matter of
social engineering, losses in certain classes of cases ought to be dis-
tributed according to ability to pay and ability to spread the loss. It
is very persuasive that a great majority of the courts have recognized
strict liability as particularly applicable to extra-hazardous activities,
and more specifically to blasting cases.17
If we recognize the need for strict liability in blasting cases, three
approaches are available for arriving at this result:' 8 (1) the nuisance
approach; 19 (2) the Rylands v. Fletcher approach,20 which bases
liability upon the escape of a destructive force as a result of a "non-
natural use of land;" and (3) the extra-hazardous activity approach
of the Restatement of Torts.2' The following considerations indicate
that the Restatement approach is preferable.
First, the theory of nuisance is that the defendant has unreasonably
interfered with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of land, not that he
has done physical damage to it.22 Normally, nuisance liability is abso-
lute or based upon negligence depending upon whether the invasion
is intentional or negligent, respectively. 23 Since the invasion incident
to blasting is unintentional, we have a basis for imposing strict liability
only if we recognize a special class of blasting or extra-hazardous
activity nuisance. Many courts have done this, but even then, the
16 See Marlowe Constr. Co. v. Jacobs, 302 S.W. 2d 612 (Ky. 1957).
'7 See Prosser, Torts see. 59 (2d ed. 1955).
18 Ibid.
19 Id. sees. 59, 70.20 Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). This approach is sum-
marized in Prosser, Torts see. 59 (2d ed. 1955). Dean Prosser says the majority
of jurisdictions, including many which reject Rylands v. Fletcher by name be-
cause of a failure to appreciate the broad, evolved scope of its application, accept
this concept under various guises. Kentucky has expressly rejected it. Shell v.
Town of Evarts, 296 Ky. 602, 178 S.W. 2d 32 (1944); Rogers v. Bond Bros., 279
Ky. 239, 130 S.W. 2d 22 (1939).
213 Restatement, Torts sees. 519-520 and comments (1938).
22 Prosser, Torts sec. 70 (2d ed. 1955).
23 Id. see. 70 at 393.
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abnormal character of the activity depends upon the place and man-
ner in which it is carried on, the harm inflicted or threatened, and
the utility of the defendant's conduct; and to this extent the question
of reasonable use is still involved.24 Unreasonableness may not in fact
exist.
Second, the Rylands v. Fletcher "non-Natural" rule makes strict
liability depend upon the nature of the activity in relation to when
and where it is conducted.2 5 The possibility of harm in the activity
is the numerator, the time and place is the denominator. It has been
equated to an "unreasonable risk" approach,20 but whether it is
or not, it does not place upon the defendant the burden of accidents
in all cases. In this respect, it falls short of fully meeting the problem
of protecting innocent victims. For instance, would strict liability
apply for blasting in rural, sparsely populated areas of Kentucky, as
in the principal case? It should. There is in this view the further
limitation as to the type of harm threatened, so that there may not be
strict liability where, as a result of blasting, a rock is thrown to an
unheard of distance and causes damage.2 7 Unless we are really talking
about fault or foreseeability, this is the time when strict liability is
most urgently needed.
The third approach, that of the Restatement, makes a broader
generalization. It classifies blasting as an extra-hazardous activity
because it "creates a risk of serious harm which cannot be avoided
by the utmost care and precaution" and is an activity which is not "a
matter of common usage."28 This approach has two important ad-
vantages. It is administratively convenient, because it avoids the prob-
lem of drawing the geographical line where strict liability ends and
negligence begins. This, of course, leads to equal treatment and con-
sistent results, and the principal case shows the difficulty which the
court must face in drawing such a line. Nor does the Restatement ex-
clude pure accidents from the scope of liability. The Restatement view
would seem to be that of the Oregon Supreme Court, which said:
'The right of all within the circle of danger should be
equal', . . . irrespective of distance and the character of the locality
where the blasting operation is carried on, and the 'circle of danger'
is determined by the event, not by judicial appraisal of 'likelihood'
(whether subjective or objective) that the particular damage com-
plained of would result 2 9
24 Id. sec. 59 at 331.
25 Id. see. 59.
26 Prosser, Selected Topics on the Law of Torts 185 (1953); see a criticism
of this view in 2 Harper and James, Torts sec. 14.4, at 801 (1956).
27 Prosser, Torts 360 (2d ed. 1955).
28 3 Restatement, Torts sec. 520, comments c and e (1938).2 9 Bedel v. Goulter, 199 Or. 344, 261 P. 2d 842, 850 (1953).
[Vol. 46,
REcENT CASES
This squarely and comprehensively meets the problem of innocent
victims, and yet the burden on the blaster is not unreasonable. It
simply means that, without regard to fault, accidents are a cost of
the blaster's business. The social considerations are the same whether
the injury resulted from negligence or from an accident.
The Restatement provides express limitations on liability in addi-
tion to those inhering in the basic rule. The harm must have resulted
from a risk which makes the activity extra-hazardous, and in special
instances certain other limitations apply.30 The principal extension of
liability is for pure accidents, which should be a relatively small
additional burden. If the cases are indicative of the true state of
facts, almost all blasting is conducted by blasting companies. Fears
that they could not bear the burden could be assuaged by pointing to
the success of strict liability in other fields. A field could hardly be
supposed in which its application is more appropriate. The Oregon
Court said of this broader application of strict liability in blasting
cases:
These conclusions, though they may not have the support
of the majority of courts of this country, are, we think, consonant
with the trend of present day judicial thinking and with modem con-
cepts of justice.31
Kenneth B. Kusch
303 Restatement, Torts secs. 521, 523, 524 (2) (1938); the instances in which
the actor will not be relieved of strict liability are set out in sees. 522, 524 (1).31 Bedell v. Coulter, 199 Or. 344, 261 P. 2d 842, 850 (1953).
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